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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Tara Crist appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. She asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to withdraw
her Alford1 plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Crist was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia.

(R., p.47.)

She subsequently entered an Alford plea to

possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.119.) At the sentencing hearing, counsel
for Ms. Crist informed the court that there had been a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship and that Ms. Crist wished to withdraw her plea.

(R., p.156.) The district

court permitted counsel to withdraw and appointed the public defender to represent
Ms. Crist. (R., p.157 .) The court permitted Ms. Crist to file a motion to withdraw her
plea and set a hearing date for that motion. (R., p.157.)
Counsel for Ms. Crist then filed a motion to withdraw her plea on the basis that
Ms. Crist no longer wished to accept the plea offer and wished to take the case to trial.
(R., p.169.) Ms. Crist testified at the evidentiary hearing on her motion. She stated that
on the day she entered her Alford plea, all she had been doing is "a lot of thinking and
crying and fighting with my husband and - just because of the whole thing." (Tr., p.7,
Ls.7-10.)2 She testified that she at the time she entered her plea, she was represented
by a different attorney; she requested a new attorney because, "I didn't feel like he had

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

enough time for me for one. Every time we'd come to court he would always talk about
where he had to be and - right after me, so I was pretty much taking up his time
whether I pleaded guilty or not guilty." (Tr., p.7, Ls.20-24.) She also stated that he
demanded an additional $5,000 to take her case to trial, which she did not have.
(Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.2.)
When asked why she was fighting with her husband, Ms. Crist stated, "[i]t's just
that I've been emotionally unstable, just crying all the time, and he's - he'll want to do
something, and I'd rather stay home or just -." (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-11.) They would fight
about, "[e]verything you can think of, friends, family, kids." (Tr., p.8, Ls.18-19.)
When her case was called, "I couldn't really talk to the judge. I was crying, and
there was no contact between - no eye contact or nothing like that because I did not
want to plead guilty at all." (Tr., p.9, Ls.4-7.) She felt sick that day, because, "when
you're pleaded guilty to something that is not yours, you're going to feel sick. That's
how I feel anyway. I still do." (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-18.)
A recess had to be called when she entered her plea because she was unable to
make it through the hearing the first time around.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.19-25.)

During this

recess, she spoke to her attorney, and, "he was not willing to look beyond anything
other than a state witness, and he didn't want to talk about anything else. I was wasting
his time and - I mean, I sent for my paperwork from his office and still haven't received
it."

(Tr., p.10, Ls.8-15.)

Ms. Crist testified that she had not pleaded voluntarily,

because,
Considering what I have been through in the past, I have a lot of time
hanging over my head, so, therefore, like [her previous attorney] said, you
2

There are several volumes of transcripts that have been prepared for this appeal.
Unless otherwise noted, citations to the transcript in this brief are to the transcript of the
August 16, 2010, hearing on the motion to withdraw Ms. Grist's plea.
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know, hey, you can either go and do six months, nine months or whatever
and then go 7 to 14 years if I was found guilty. So, therefore, I [felt] it
would be better to take whatever is best, but I still didn't want to do it.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.14-21.) She further explained,
I shouldn't have done it. I did not want to do it from the beginning, and I
don't understand an Afford guilty plea. I still don't. I've read about it, and
it's in the paper all the time, and I read it. I don't understand it. I don't
think it should be legal because, like I told [prior counsel], I said, 'What if I
take it and then they come back and tell me, 'he, well, we did fingerprints
on this bag and they weren't yours,' so, therefore, I perjured myself and
said it was?' And he says, 'Well, you've got a point there, but I don't think
that's going to happen.'
(Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.13, L.3.) Finally, Ms. Crist testified that she asked her attorney for
fingerprints and an audio and video, and was never able to see anything.

(Tr., p.13,

Ls.6-10.) Further, when she first went to court, the prosecutor referenced a receipt, and
she had never been able to see this alleged receipt. (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17.)
On

cross-examination,

Ms.

Crist

agreed

with

the

prosecutor

that

he

recommended drug court as part of the agreement and that she like the option of drug
court better than the risk of going to prison; however, she stated that she did not need
drug court-

she was taking it because that was the deal the prosecutor offered.

(Tr., p.16, L.10 p .17, L.12.) Ms. Crist acknowledged that she was not accepted to drug
court because she was late. (Tr., p.17, Ls.19-25.) When asked if she had a chance to
review the presentence investigation report, she stated that she and her attorney met
for about five minutes and that it was not because of the report that she was seeking to
withdraw her plea. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-15.) She did acknowledge that she knew she was
not going to be accepted into drug court when she moved to withdraw her plea.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.17-19.)
Shannon Taylor, a deputy with the Cassia County Sheriff's Office, testified that
there was an outstanding warrant for Lisa Baxter and that, "she is not in custody. At
3

least not in our jail." (Tr., p.28, L4 - p.30, L.9.) The prosecutor then represented to the
court that Ms. Baxter "is a very important witness, perhaps even a necessary witness.
She had agreed to testify against Tara Crist, and I can provide the Court with
documentation from her case if I need to." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-9.) The prosecutor stated
that, "where this is a constructive possession case and Ms. Baxter was driving the car
that Tara Crist was a passenger in, then I think that that's - she's an important witness.
There's prejudice to the state .... " (Tr., p.31, Ls.20-25.)
Following this evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Ms. Grist's motion.
(R., p.172; 176.) The court noted that Ms. Crist was "generally aware of a possibly
more severe sanction based on not getting into drug court and not having that available
when it came time for sentencing ... " (Tr., p.49, Ls.15-21.) However, the district court
stated that it was not going to, "hold [the] review of the presentence investigation itself
against Ms. Crist in this case" because there had been discussion of withdrawing the
plea before Ms. Crist had reviewed the report. (Tr., p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.15.)
The court concluded that Ms. Crist was fully aware of the consequences of this
case, including the fact that she had a prior conviction.

(Tr., p.50, Ls.16-24.) "She

testified about the things that any rational defendant would look at ... " (Tr., p.50, Ls.2225.) The court noted that it was, "inherent that it's a difficult decision to decide to plead
guilty to a felony when there may be defenses to it, there could be issues, and it is
rational and the exact purpose of an Alford plea for a defendant to consider the benefits
of taking the agreement versus the risks of going to trial." (Tr., p.50, Ls.4-9.) The court
considered the fact that while Ms. Crist was very emotional at the entry of plea hearing,
she was given the opportunity to speak to her attorney. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-25.)

4

The court put little weight on the fact that there was an outstanding warrant on
Ms. Baxter, concluding that there was no evidence that Ms. Crist was aware of the
outstanding warrant, and that the State could still potentially find her and obtain the
same testimony. (Tr., p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.12.)
Finally, the court concluded,
I'm aware it's an issue of discretion, reviewed the cases and some of the
factors that we've discussed as well as the rule and noting that the burden
is on the defendant to show a just reason for withdrawal of plea, the Court
will deny the motion to withdraw plea. The plea was knowingly and
intelligently made at the time. The defendant was given a chance for
recesses, was given a chance to talk to attorneys, said she could review
the discovery, had reviewed the discovery, had a chance to give drug
court a try and was late.
[ .. ']

Regardless of what was the PSI or [her attorney] may have said, she
knew the consequences. So it's similar to those cases where a defendant
is just trying to weigh the consequences and got the benefit of the plea,
put the state at a disadvantage thereby, which is, again, hard to weigh
exactly what the disadvantage may or may not be because you never
know exactly what a codefendant's testimony is going to be, but light of all
that, the motion to withdraw the plea is denied.
(Tr., p.57, L.17 - p.58, L.20.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction.

(R., p.188; 190.)

Ms. Crist appealed. (R., p.202.) She asserts that the district court abused its discretion
by denying her motion to withdraw her Alford plea.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Grist's motion to withdraw
her Alford plea?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Grist's Motion To Withdraw
Her Alford Plea

A.

Introduction
After she entered her Alford plea, but prior to sentencing, Ms. Crist moved to

withdraw her plea. The district court denied Ms. Grist's motion. Ms. Crist asserts that
the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw his Alford plea.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Grist's Motion To
Withdraw Her Alford Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is generally governed by the provisions of

I.C.R. 33(c), which provides that such a motion, "may be made only before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant
to withdraw the defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The district court's decision whether to
grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea is reviewed on appeal for
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). However,
the district court must act within the proper bounds of that discretion and consistent with
the legal standards that are applicable to its determination. State v. Warren, 135 Idaho
836, 839 (Ct. App. 2001).
The district court should liberally apply its discretion when presented with a
motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing. Arthur, 145 Idaho at
222.

When evaluating a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion, the

sequence of inquiry is: first, whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; second, whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of
7

its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and finally, whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991 ).
The legal standards governing the district court's review of a defendant's motion
to withdraw a guilty plea depend upon the timing of the defendant's motion. Id. When
the defendant makes the motion prior to sentencing, he or she need only show "just
cause" to withdraw the plea. Id. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and
prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting
the right of the accused to trial by jury. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530 (Ct. App.
2008). A district court may deny such a motion where the defendant fails to present and
support a plausible reason for the withdrawal.

State v. Wyatt, 131 Idaho 95, 97

(Ct. App. 1998). Denial is also proper where the state demonstrates that it would be
prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id.
Additionally, special considerations are permitted when the defendant's motion to
withdraw comes before sentencing, but after the defendant has had the opportunity to
review the content of the presentence investigation report.

In such cases, the district

court "may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Arthur,
145 Idaho at 222.
In contrast, a much stricter standard applies when the defendant moves to
withdraw his or her guilty plea after sentencing.

In such cases, a defendant must

demonstrate manifest injustice in order to be entitled to a withdrawal of the plea.

State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859 (Ct. App. 2007). Manifest injustice is established if
the plea was not taken in compliance with the due process requirements that the plea
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id.
8

While the first step in analyzing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
to examine whether the plea is constitutionally valid, this is not the last or necessarily
dispositive analysis when the defendant's motion is made prior to sentencing. State v.
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). Even if the plea itself is constitutionally

valid, the district court is required to consider whether the reasons for seeking
withdrawal of the guilty plea meet the lesser standard of just cause. Id.
Ms. Crist agrees with the district court that the proper standard to apply is the just
cause standard where a defendant has not reviewed the presentence investigation
report. (See Tr., p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.15.) While Ms. Crist agrees that the district court
perceived the issue as one of discretion and applied the proper legal standard, she
respectfully asserts that the district court did not reach its conclusion through an
exercise of reason.
While it is true that Ms. Crist knew that she would not be accepted into drug court
at the time she moved to withdraw her guilty plea, there is no evidence that this was the
reason she moved to withdraw her guilty plea.

Ms. Crist specifically asserted, and

testified, that she was moving to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis that she was not
guilty of the instant crime and that she felt pressured to enter a plea at the change of
plea hearing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.9, Ls.16-18.) And while the district court was correct
that Ms. Crist was afforded additional time to discuss the case with her attorney at the
change of plea hearing, Ms. Crist specifically testified that her attorney still pressured
her to enter her plea during the recess. (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-15.)
Ms. Crist established just cause despite the fact that she knew she would not be
accepted to drug court and had additional time to discuss the case with her attorney.
The record is clear that Ms. Crist felt pressure to plead guilty based on the emotional
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turmoil in her life and the fact that her attorney led her to believe she was interfering
with his time and wanted her to plead guilty.
Further, the State's assertion that it would be prejudiced was hardly convincing.
The State only presented evidence that there was an outstanding warrant for
Ms. Baxter.

(Tr., p.30, Ls.10-13.) There was no representation made regarding the

State's attempts to contact Ms. Baxter, there was simply the assertion the State did not
know where she was. (Tr., p.31, Ls.10-19) And as the district court noted, it was still
very possible that the State would be able to locate Ms. Baxter prior to any trial in this
case. (Tr., p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.12.)
Ms. Crist asserts that, due to her mental state and the fact that her attorney had
pressured her into entering her plea, she establish just cause to withdraw her plea and
that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her Alford
plea.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Crist requests that the district court's order denying her motion to withdraw
her Alford plea be reversed, that her conviction be vacated, and that her case be
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2011.

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State' Appellate Public Defender
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